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"REASON AND PASSION":
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIALETIC OF
FREE SPEECH AND OBSCENITY
JOHN M. FINNIS t
In recent obscenity cases, the Supreme Court has been attempting
to define the constitutional meaning of "speech." 1 This is not as
banal a statement as it may seem, for there are critics, both on and off
the Court, who think that the Court's task is to define "freedom."
Some advocate boundless freedom in this area. For them,
obscenity raises no special problems of definition, and is simply an
exercise of speech or press presenting dangers which are remote and
disputable, rather than clear and present. From this point of view,
exemplified by Justices Black' and Douglas,' the only relevant dis-
tinction is that between "speech" and "conduct." Obscenity is self-
evidently a matter of "expression of ideas" as opposed to "conduct,"
and so the only remaining question is rhetorical: Does the Constitution
permit a line to be drawn between good ideas and bad?
Other critics, however, have refused to be bluffed by rhetorical
questions. They would limit freedom of speech only to the extent
required by a careful balancing with other values. This tradition,
exemplified by Justices Frankfurter 4 and Harlan,' demands a strenuous
examination of the concept of obscenity in order to reveal the vice it
may connote and the values it may threaten.' In each individual case,
the courts must balance the requirements of free speech against the
t LL.B. 1961, Adelaide University, D.Phil. 1966, Oxford University. Fellow of
University College, Oxford.
1 There is a distinction between "speech" and "press," but generally "expression"
encompasses both. Cf. Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and
the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REv. 295, 299 n.31 (1954).
2 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J., dis-
senting) ; Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 517-18 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
8See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 491-92 (1966) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.
Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413, 433 (1966) (Douglas, J., concurring) [hereinafter
cited as Memoirs v. Massachusetts].
4 See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 691 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
5 See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 455 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
6 Cf. P. KAUPER, CrvIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 58-60, 111-26 (1962) ;
Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Stand-
ards, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 5 (1960) ; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 373-87.
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evils which American society believes will flow from certain expressions
of ideas.7
Both these schools have tended unreflectingly to tie the problem
of obscenity to traditional doctrines developed in the more general
context of free speech, for both fallaciously assume that obscenity in-
volves the expression of ideas. Both schools thus fail to discern the
core problem of defining "speech," or to appreciate the bedrock concept
which underlies the prevailing attempts by the Court to solve this
problem.' This concept, which stands in sharp contrast to the two
traditional perspectives just outlined, is that obscene utterances "are
no essential part of any exposition of ideas."9
The aim of this article is to sketch the intellectual basis of this
newer perspective, to amplify its background, and to indicate the way
in which it has shaped the substantive constitutional law on obscenity.
I
Obscenity involves the expression of "ideas," as that term is
commonly used and understood. However, for Mr. Justice Brennan,
there are some communications which have "saving intellectual con-
tent" o and others, including obscenity, which involve neither the
exposition nor advocacy of ideas.-" Thus, he describes the reader
of obscenity as looking "for titillation, not for saving intellectual
content." "z This contrast, much relied upon by Mr. Justice Brennan
in the obscenity cases, corresponds to a distinction between two often
competing aspects of the human mind: the intellect or reason and the
emotions or passions. Since Mr. Justice Brennan would agree with a
characterization of protected first amendment "speech" as "the com-
munication of information or opinion," 13 "the exposition of ideas" 14
7 See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S.
684, 708 (1959) (Harlan, J., concurring) ; id. at 694-97 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
8The problem of defining "speech" to exclude obscenity is briefly noted in Cairns,
Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship: The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and the
Empirical Evidence, 46 MImN. L. REv. 1009, 1012-13 (1962). Cf. T. MURPHY, CEN-
soRsHrIP: GovERNmENT AND OBscENIT 120-29 (1963). In both sources, however,
the constitutional problem is muddled with the problem of why obscenity should or
should not be proscribed. See also Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional
Freedom, 8 ST. Louis U.LJ. 279, 347-48, 455-56, 476 (1964) ; Note, Obscenity Prose-
cution: Artistic Value and the Concept of Immunity, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1063, 1084-86
(1964).
9 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942), quoted with emphasis
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
IGGinzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966). See also note 37 infra.
11 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) ; cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
12 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 479 (1966).
13 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310. (1940) (Roberts, J.).
14 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952) (Frankfurter, 3.).
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or, in general, the intellectual component in the psychology of com-
munication, and since he characterizes obscenity as pertaining to the
realm of emotion and passion, it follows that for him obscenity is
outside the protection of that amendment. 5 This contrast between
reason and the passions is the distinctively formative concept in the
emerging constitutional law of obscenity. What is notable and fre-
quently overlooked about Roth v. United States "I is its abandonment 17
of the notion, formulated in English and earlier American law, that
obscenity should be constitutionally defined in terms of the tendency to
"deprave and corrupt." 1s Although a shift away from the "deprave
and corrupt" formula had been evident in earlier decisions of federal
courts,' 9 Roth completed the replacement of the ambiguous notion of
tendency to sexual corruption (which had been accepted even by the
Supreme Court ') with the relatively less ambiguous notion of "ap-
pealing to prurient interest." 21 "Corruption" provided an ambiguous
standard because it straddled the realms of ideas and passions. Hence,
if the first amendment was to protect all expositions of ideas, "cor-
ruption" had to be replaced by a formula which unambiguously ex-
cluded passions, emotions and desires. Such was the task and achieve-
ment of Roth.
Some modern commentators have noted that obscenity may
connote not only offensiveness and stimulation, but also an ideological
element-that is, ideas capable of undermining the community's sexual
philosophy and values.' Commentators rarely recognize, however,
that this potentially confusing duality is linked to the ambiguity of the
"deprave and corrupt" formula as formerly used by English and
15A genealogy of this syllogism would include Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) ; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
18 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
17 Id. at 489.
18 The "deprave and corrupt" test stems from Regina v. Hicklin [1868], L.R.
3 Q.B. 360, 371. For the reception of Hicklin into American law, see United States
v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1104 (No. 14,571) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) ; United States
v Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (L. Hand, J.) ; Slough & McAnany,
supra note 8, at 285-92.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 569 (2d Cir. 1930); United
States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aft'd, 72
F2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 327-33.
20 See, e.g., Rosen v. United States, 161 U.S. 29, 43 (1896). But cf. Dunlop v.
United States, 165 U.S. 486, 500 (1896).
2 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
2 Z. CHA EE, GOVERNMEN T AND MASS Co MUNIcATio 210-12 (1947) ; N. ST.
JOHN-STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 126 (1956). Also see the discussions of
"thematic" or "ideological" obscenity in Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, in 1960 THE SUPREME COURT RIvW 1, 3-4, 28-34 (Kurland ed.) ; Lock-
hart & McClure, supra note 6, at 99.
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American courts.' The trial in London, in 1877, of Charles Bradlaugh
and Annie Besant for obscene libel illustrates that ambiguity.24 The
trial was conducted by Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, the author of
the so-called Hicklin test. In his remarks to the jury, the judge offered
four alternative theories on which the defendants, who had distributed
a book about contraception, could be found guilty of depraving and
corrupting: (i) if the defendants had a purpose of exciting libidinous
thoughts, intending "to give to persons who take pleasure in that sort
of thing the impure gratification which the contemplation of such
thoughts is calculated to give";25 (ii) if the book in fact contained
details inconsistent with decency and calculated to enkindle the passions
and desires of lust and excite libidinous thoughts; 2 (iii) if the book
had the effect, even if unintended, of corrupting the morals of the
unmarried, by suggesting means of escaping a salutary restraint on
their sexual conduct; 2 or (iv) if the book recommended practices of
contraception that were contrary to the sound morals that ought to
prevail within marriage.2" On the fourth theory, the jury was
instructed that a man who recommends an immoral course of proceed-
ing in an open publication is guilty, and was warned:
You must decide . . . with a due regard and reference to
the law, and with an honest and determined desire to
maintain the morals of mankind. But, on the other hand,
you must carefully consider what is due to public discussion,
and with an anxious desire not, from any prejudiced view of
this subject, to stifle what may be a subject of legitimate
inquiry.
29
The third and fourth theories of guilt bestow on the English jury a
controlling jurisdiction over the marketplace of ideas, limited only by
the jury's self-restraint. It is quite clear that, questions of incitement
and imminency of illegal action aside, the analysis just quoted cannot
be applied in the United States once the implications of the first
amendment are firmly grasped. For in America "even ideas hateful
to the prevailing climate of opinion" " are constitutionally protected.
23The ambiguity here discussed is not the ambiguity (as between thought and
action) detected in the Hicklin test by Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 332-33.
2 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTIcE, QUEEN'S BENcH DiIsIoN, JUNE 18TH, 1877,
THE QuEEN v. CHARLES BRADLAUGH AND ANN E BESANT (London, 1877) (a verbatim
report). This case is discussed at ST. JoHN-STEvAs, .supra note 22, at 70-74.
25 THQu v. BRADLAUGH, supra note 24, at 261.
261d. at 258.
2
7Id. at 266.
2 8 Id. at 263.
29Id. at 265.
30 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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So the concept of corruption, tainted as it is with a political theory
which America has abandoned, has had to be replaced by a concept
embodying only the first and second of Lord Chief Justice Cockburn's
theories; the result is to preserve the historical notion of obscenity,81
while narrowing the definition of obscenity to constitutionally acceptable
limits.' The test currently adhered to is Judge Woolsey's test of
tendency "to stir the sex impulses or to lead to sexually impure and
lustful thoughts," " reworked into the Roth test of "appealing to
prurient interest." 3
4
31 The idea of "prurient desires" makes its first appearance in the The Queen v.
Bradlaugh.
32 Of course, it is true that directions on obscenity have almost always included
the notion of suggesting impure and libidinous thoughts or something similar. But,
as in Bradlaugh, this, notion was always linked with, and liable to be affected by, the
intrinsic ambiguity of the concept of depraving and corrupting. It was often believed
that to preach against accepted moral and sexual ideas might ipso facto arouse lewd
thoughts. Cf. Burton v. United States, 142 F. 57, 63 (8th Cir. 1906). That is why,
in Bradlaugh, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, without concern, could slip from the test
of "tending to suggest unchaste and unclean thoughts, and therefore calculated to lead
to immorality," to the test of "tending to influence the passions, or recommending
some course of conduct inconsistent with public morals." THm QuExEx v. BRADLAUGH,
supra note 24, at 15, 17 (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Harmon, 45 F. 414
(C.C.D. Kan. 1891) ; United States v. Clarke, 38 F. 732, 733-34 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1889) ;
People v. Wendling, 258 N.Y. 451, 180 N.E. 169 (1932). Sometimes the reference
to lustful desires drops out altogether. People v. Dial Press, Inc., 182 Misc. 416, 417,
48 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (Magis. Ct 1944). Also see the cases cited by Lockhart &
McClure, supra note 1, at 334 n.68. As the authors there remark, "even though courts
have not often mentioned ideological obscenity as a basis of their decisions, there can
be no doubt that it has exerted a powerful influence on the law of obscene literature."
Id. at 334. Commonwealth v. Allison, 227 Mass. 57, 116 N.E. 265 (1917), is similar
to Bradlaugh, not only in its facts and result, but also in its logic and conceptual
structure.
33United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182, 184 (S.D.N.Y.
1933).
34 354 U.S. at 487. Compare the reasons advanced in Roth for excluding obscenity
from the first amendment, id. at 484-85, with those advanced in Ex parte Jackson,
96 U.S. (6 Otto) 727 (1878): "In excluding various articles from the mall, the
object of Congress has not been to interfere with freedom of the press, . . . but to
refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed injurious to the public
morals." Id. at 736 (emphasis added).
This necessary evolution in legal analysis is obscured, if not denied, by Pro-
fessors Lockhart and McClure, when they imply that the Roth test includes the
"deprave and corrupt" test, Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The De-
veloping Constitutional Standards, 45 MINx. L. REv. 5, 58 (1960), and by Mr. Justice
Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-85 (1962). Mr. Justice
Harlan's purpose in equating "tendency to deprave" with "prurient appeal," as equally
an "'effect' element" in obscenity, id. at 484, was simply to facilitate the tour de force
by which he derived from Roth both that "effect element" and the "concept of patent
offensiveness." Thus, Mr. Justice Harlan states that:
The Court there [in Roth] both rejected the "isolated excerpt" and "par-
ticularly susceptible persons" tests of the Hicklin case, 354 U.S., at 488-489,
and was at pains to point out that not all portrayals of sex could be reached
by obscenity laws but only those treating that subject "in a manner appealing
to prurient interest" 354 U.S., at 487. That, of course, was but a compendi-
ous way of embracing in the obscenity standard both the concept of patent
offensiveness . . . and the element of the likely corruptive effect .
Id. at 487. This analysis in terms of "effects," which obscures the differences of
remoteness and causality among arousing lustful thoughts, changing moral ideas and
evoking action, probably derives from Lockhart & McClure, supra note 1, at 329.
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Thus, when Mr. Justice Brennan talks of "expression of ideas,"
it is in a far more limited sense than that conveyed by ordinary usage.
The Brennan theory of free speech is, indeed, as Professor Kalven
said,35 a two-level theory; one of these levels, moreover, is held to
have social utility, and the other not." But, obscenity is regarded by
Mr. Justice Brennan as devoid of relevant or "redeeming" 11 social
utility precisely because it pertains, not to the realm of ideas, reason,
intellectual content and truth-seeking, but to the realm of passion,
desires, cravings and titillation. As such, obscenity belongs to a realm
outside first amendment protection.38 The two constitutional levels of
speech, in effect, are defined in terms of two realms of the human mind.
II
It might be said, quite truthfully, that the Supreme Court is not
bound to subscribe to any particular theory of psychology; one might
go on to assert that the alleged two realms or aspects of the human
mind are cognizable only within the confines of an outmoded faculty
psychology. It is not our present purpose to defend the Court's
present stance, nor to establish that it is constitutionally or philosoph-
ically necessary, nor even to show that it would be viable in the
light of a full understanding of personality. Our aim is simply to
emphasize the vital cultural sources of the prevailing view, and to
suggest that its foundations are not to be overturned lightly.
Empirical psychology could abandon the distinction between in-
tellect and emotions without the distinction being thereby invalidated
either for common-sense or for the philosophy of human nature. The
empirical psychologist, by the procedures of experimental science, ex-
plores various laws and recurring operations of the human psyche;
35 Kalven, .mpra note 22, at 10-16.
36Id. Kalven's emphasis can be misleading. This is true despite the emphasis
on "social utility" in Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpreta-
tionz of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1965). The question that must
always be pressed is why obscenity is held by the Court to be without redeeming
social merit or value, bearing in mind that the Court is not considering whether or
why obscenity should be legislatively proscribed. Failure to put this question appar-
ently derails the argument in Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The
Central Meaning of the First Ame dment," in 1964 THE SuPREmE COURT REVEW
191 (Kurland ed.). See note 101 infra.
37 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Notice how the Roth phrase,
"redeeming social importance" becomes "saving intellectual content!' in Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
8It is ironic that the theory that "such utterances are no essential part of any
expression of ideas" originated in Z. CHAEz FREE SPEc IN THE UITrrE STATES
150 (1941), and was repeated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Beauharnais v. Illinois,
343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952), for both Professor Chafee and Mr. Justice Frankfurter
were radically opposed to absolutism in this area, and both espoused a balancing-of-
interests doctrine. See, e.g., Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARv. L. REv. 891, 894 (1949) ;
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
1967]
228 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
and the formulation of these laws and schemes of recurrence may not
require use of terms such as "intelligence," "reason," "emotion"' or
"passions." Both common sense and philosophy, however, are likely
to insist that, if the psychologist's own statement of his results is
intelligent and reasonable, it is not merely a product of psychic laws
and operations, and still less a product of his emotions. By this in-
sistence, common sense and philosophy promote a more compre-
hensive analysis of human nature, such as Freud proposed when he
stated that, although "purely reasonable motives can effect little against
passionate impulsions" and "emotional forces," nevertheless "we have
no other means of controlling our instinctual nature but our
intelligence." "
The distinction was emphasized by Plato, who likened man's mind
to a charioteer (reason) controlling the horses of passions and desires,
to a world at war with itself, and to a puppet drawn by the strings of
reason and passion.40 Aristotle reported that it was the "common
opinion" of his own time that weak-willed men act as a result of
passion, whereas continent and virtuous men follow their reason,
rather than their appetites.4 ' No doubt this remains a general opinion;
our culture has been formed not only by the Greeks but also by the
Christian awareness that "flesh lusteth against the spirit," 42 and that
"the spirit indeed is willing but the flesh is weak." "
Still, an appeal to such a philosophy is likely to occasion the re-
mark that the alleged distinction between reason and emotion is
nothing but a naive and incoherent dualism, quite unfitted to support
reasoned legal distinctions. This criticism, however, is too facile.
Philosophy has seen many attempts to explicate the perceived dis-
tinction between aspects of the mind, and no doubt some can be con-
victed of dualist incoherence. But in relying on the distinction, the
justices of the Court would not commit themselves to any particular
philosophical explication of it.
39 The Fture of an Illufsion, in 21 S. FREuD, COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS
42, 47, 52 (J. Strachey ed. 1961).
40 PLATO, PHAEDRUS 246a (3d ed. B. Jowett transl. 1892); 1 PLATO, LAWS
644d-45c, at 63-65 (R. Bury transl. 1952).
4 1 ARmsTOTLE NICHOIXACHEAN ETHICS 1145a15-b20 (W. Ross transl. 1925). Aris-
totle elaborated a complete philosophical psychology of the intellect in his De Anima,
and of the passions in his Rhetoric. The Aristotelian theory of virtues is essentially
a theory of the harmonious interaction of the rational and sensitively appetitive
principles in a man's make-up. It is worth noting, incidentally, that Aristotle and
his followers consider that defects in reasonableness, such as imprudence, precipitate-
ness, thoughtlessness and inconstancy, derive from the sensitive appetite for pleasure,
and (some add) "above all for sexual pleasure, which quite absorbs the mind and
entices it to sensible delights." AQuINAS, SummA THEoLoGIAE 1I-II, 53, 6; cf.
NICHOMAcHEAN ETHICS 1152b17.
42 Galatians 5:17. See also Romans 7.
4 3 Matthew 26:41.
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Now there is another reputable philosophical tradition which
believes that: "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the
passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and
obey them." " This formulation is extreme, but Hume's radical
softening of the contrast between intellect and emotion has profoundly
influenced modern thought. Yet even Hume retains the contrasted
notions of reason and passion, though his explanation of the terms
and their interrelations might, if adopted, make the two-level theory
of speech less attractive (although a Justice, as a private philosopher,
might be inclined to ask how Hume's own cool and penetrating in-
telligence can be reconciled with an account of human nature in which
there is such scant place for intelligence and pure reasonableness).
James Madison, who wrote his Federalist papers with Hume's
political writings beside him," shared with Hume that wholly typical
eighteenth century outlook which saw human life in terms of a struggle
between reason and the passions. But, unlike Hume, Madison stood
in the classical tradition, which expressly exalted reason above the
passions. Every reader of The Federalist will recall the central im-
portance, in Madison's theory of republicanism, of control of the
passions by reason: "[I]t is reason, alone, of the public, that ought to
control and regulate the government. The passions ought to be con-
troled and regulated by the government." "
Madison realized, moreover, that the evils of faction derive
from passion; faction, by definition, arises from "some common im-
pulse of passion." 4 Yet, although "[1] iberty is to faction, what air
is to fire, an aliment, without which it instantly expires," " liberty in
Madison's view "is essential to political life." ' Clearly, liberty cannot
be essential for the sake of allowing passions and faction their sway.
Rather, that liberty which is so essential is liberty of opinion, not
passions, even if regrettably, "the former will be objects to which the
latter will attach themselves." "
When men exercise their reason coolly and freely on a
variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different
opinions on some of them. When they are governed by a
common passion, their opinions, if they are so to be called,
will be the same.51
44 Hume, Treatise of Human Nature vol. 2, pt. 3, § 2, in PHILOSOPHICAL WoRs
OF DAvID Hu E 195 (T. Green ed. 1874).
45 See Adair, "That Politics May be Reduced to a Science": David Hume, James
Madison, and the Tenth Federalist, 20 HUNTiNGroN LiRARY Q. 343, 358 n.17 (1957).
46 Ta. FEMzALIST No. 49, at 351 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
47 THE F.DRa~isT No. 10, at 130 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
5 1 THE FE-DEAIxsT No. 50, at 353 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (Madison).
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Hence, Madison valued freedom of speech because it supplied the
community with independent (rational) critics of the government. 2
It is thus possible to draw a constitutional theorem from the basic
thought of The Federalist-: to the extent that expressions derive from
the passion end of the reason-passion continuum, the rationale for
their freedom disappears. Translated into a twentieth century context,
this is the basis of the two-level theory in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire 53 and Roth.
Although the eighteenth century distinction between reason and
passion has overtones to which we are now more or less deaf, a similar
distinction has preserved a central place in our thought. For example,
standard modem textbooks of philosophy contain discussions of the
emotive as opposed to the cognitive meaning or force of words, or of
cognitivist as opposed to emotivist theories of ethics. The average
modem critic of censorship is apt to remark that its supporters are
guided by feeling, not reason. There is no point in multiplying
examples, for they lie to hand in every field of modern thought.
In short, the two-level theory of speech and of the mind cannot be
convicted of provincialism. While it is not the place of a judge to
espouse controversial philosophical theories as such, he is entitled,
and indeed required, to adopt some viewpoint on human nature by
which to orientate his reasoning. He is not obliged to desist on the
plea that his viewpoint may include controverted questions.
III
The Supreme Court's opinion in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,54
although it deals directly with problems of sacrilege rather than
obscenity, and Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion in Kingsley International
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York ;r share with
Roth a foundation in the two-level conceptual structure.
Burstyn offered to answer the question "whether motion pictures
are within the ambit of protection which the First Amendment . . .
secures to any form of 'speech' or the 'the press.' " 56 The major
premise of the answer to this significantly worded question was
that motion pictures are a significant medium for the com-
munication of ideas. They may affect public attitudes and
52 Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YAT L.J. 464, 476 (1956).
See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957): "The protection given
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
53 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
54 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
55 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
5 343 U.S. at 501.
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behavior in a variety of ways, ranging from direct espousal
of a political or social doctrine to the subtle shaping of
thought which characterizes all artistic expression.57
In Kingsley the Court conceded that the film in question presented
adultery as a desirable or proper pattern of behavior, and also accepted
that the film did not constitute an incitement to illegal action. The
Court then determined that:
[w]hat New York has done, therefore, is to prevent
the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture advo-
cates an idea-that adultery under certain circumstances may
be proper behavior. Yet the First Amendment's basic guar-
antee is of freedom to advocate ideas. . . . Its guarantee
is not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional
or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion
that adultery may sometimes be proper . . . . And in the
realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no
less than that which is unconvincing."
But this exposition of the two-level theory of speech raises further
questions: Is art constitutionally protected only because it advocates
ideas? "' Would not such a theory be radically untrue to the nature
of art? Would it not make nonsense of the Court's recognition of
the redeeming value of art? Indeed, would it not amount to the
constitutional canonization of sheer philistinism?
Aesthetics contains a welter of conflicting doctrines, but there is
universal agreement that artistic work does not derive its artistic value
from any "message" which it may happen to convey and which could
be presented in the form of ordinary discursive thinking. Aesthetic
attention is not looking at something in order to find out about
something. There is universal agreement, too, that art in all its
forms neither derives from, nor appeals to, pure reason alone or even
primarily. The stock-in-trade of reason is conceptions, definitions,
reasons, judgments, doctrines, formulae, arguments, discourse. But
67Id.
.58 360 U.S. at 688-89. At a later date, Mr. Justice Stewart attempted to amplify
his special notion of "hard-core pornography," as including material which "cannot
conceivably be characterized as embodying communication of ideas or artistic values
inviolate under the First Amendment" Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
499 n.3 (1966) (quoting from Brief of Solicitor General).
69 See text accompanying notes 104-08 infra. The question is fairly raised in
Kalven, mupra note 22, at 15-16, and given a simplistic solution in Note, 39 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1063, 1084-85 (1964), and in Note, 34 U. Cl. L. REv. 367, 383 (1967). Semonche,
Definitional and Contextual Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing
Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1173, 1186-87 (1966) asks: "Is the Court saying
that the life of the intellect is more worthy of protection than the life of the imagi-
nation?"
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none of these constitute the substance of artistic work or aesthetic ex-
perience as such; hence, none of them can constitute the redeeming
value of art as art (though it would be absurd to say that they have
no place in artistic production or appreciation; literature is art, and
criticism thrives). In the foregoing sections of this article, we spoke
of another realm, that of emotions and passions. We did not dis-
tinguish, within this realm, between sensation, feelings, experience,
imagination, emotion. Be that as it may, there is universal agreement
that this other realm, however it is to be characterized, is vitally en-
gaged in all artistic work and appreciation. If this is true, what be-
comes of the constitutional theorem adduced to outlaw obscenity from
the protection of the first amendment?
It is to that question that the present section is addressed. The
answer proposed is not, perhaps, one that would gain the sort of
universal assent mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. But it
occupies a central place in the varied doctrines of aesthetics, and com-
mands support, in the main, from widely ranging philosophical tradi-
tions. It does not diverge from the common-sense view of the matter,
and it is capable of explaining the status accorded to art in our culture
and in the theory of the Supreme Court.
By "art," in this account,6" is meant the "creation of forms
symbolic of human feeling." 6' A symbol is a sensuous object which
by virtue of its highly articulated structure can express the forms of
vital experience-feeling, life, motion and emotion-which purely
intellectual discourse cannot convey. The contrast, noted above, be-
tween rational discourse and art is so marked that superficial thinkers
are tempted to suppose that the function of art is to stimulate feelings.
62
But an artist is not a manipulator who, having studied the psychology
of his audience, allows his findings to guide his work; he is not a cook
selecting the recipes that will appeal to the palate. Aesthetic attention is
not to be equated with the exploitation of gratifying sensory stimulants.
What makes art art is not that it stimulates feelings, which any family
picture album can do," but that it expresses them symbolically. To be
60 This account is primarily based on the ideas and terminology of S. LANGER,
FEELING AND FORm (1953). It also draws on other traditions, such as the "Oxford"
linguistic school and neo-Thomism, as indicated in following notes.
61Id. at 40.
62Id. at 18.
63 Id. at 107. See also Strawson, Aesthetic Appraisal and Works of Art, OxFoRa
REviEw Oct. 1966, at 12: ". . . an aesthetic interest in an individual is not any kind
of practical interest, not an interest in anything it can or should do, or that we can
do with it, not even an interest in specific responses (say, excitement or stupefaction)
which it will produce in us. (If it were this sort of interest, there could indeed be
general rules and recipes.)"
64See R. BERGm, THE LAwGUAGE OF ART 32 (1963).
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more precise, art expresses ideas of feeling, 5 and it does this by em-
bodying these ideas in the more or less conventional symbolic forms 61
of music, painting, sculpture, architecture, poetry, drama and prose.
Just as an actor does not vent his own emotions, but conceives and
enacts the emotions of the character being played, 67 so the creative
artist is not so much venting his own emotions, as imagining and
conceiving emotions and feelings in such fashion that his understanding
of them can be communicated through the symbolic form of his chosen
art."8 Art, then, gives to those who attend to it aesthetically, an
insight into the life of feeling, vitality and emotion.' But it com-
municates the insight not by discourse, reasoning or judgments, not
by saying anything about the nature of feeling, but by showing it in
symbolic form.7" This is even true of the symbolic forms of the
literary arts that use propositional discourse as their material.
71
"[T]he emotion in the work is the thought in the work"; V "the
sensuous quality is in the service of its vital import." 7'
Artistic creation and appreciation, then, operate between the two
main levels of the mind. Art forces a modification of the two-aspects
theory of the mind,74 since the peculiar triumph of art is to weld these
levels of experience in a unique way that gives deep emotional and
05 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 59. See also R. BERGER, supra note 64, at 54:
"Instead of trying to define the truth as an idea does, form seeks to convey the feeling,
the sensation of truth. By its means truth ceases to be an abstract notion and becomes
an experience." Berger's terminology differs from Langer's, but the thought is the
same.
6 8 See S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 280.
67 Id. at 323.
6sIad. at 28.
69 Id. at 129. See also J. MA~rrAIN, ART AND SCHOLASTICISM 163 (3d ed. J.
Evans transl. 1962) : "[in the perception of the beautiful the intellect is, through the
means of the sensuible intuition itself, placed in the presence of a radiant intelligibility
70 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 227, 393.
If it [the intellect] turns away from sense to abstract and reason, it turns
away from its joy and loses contact with this radiance.
To understand this, let us recall that it is intellect and sense as forming
but one, or, if one may so speak, the intellegentiated sense, which gives rise
in the heart to aesthetic joy.
J. MA=rIAn, supra note 69, at 164. See also Analytic of the Beautiful § 15, in I.
KANT, CRITIQUE OF AESTHETIC JUDGMENT (J. Meredith transl. 1911).
71Cf. Henry Miller, Obscenity and the Law of Reflection, 51 Ky. LJ. 577, 582
(1963): ". . . painters, however unapproachable their work may be, are seldom
subject to the same meddling interference as writers. Language, because it also
serves as a means of communication, tends to bring about weird obfuscations."
72 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 82.
73Id. at 59. See also Kaplan, Obscenity as an Aesthetic Category, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRon. 544, 548 (1955).
74 Such a modification is attempted in Jenkins, The Huran Function of Art,
4 PoarLSHIcALa Q. 128 (1954). He argues that the three relevant aspects of the
psyche are the "affective," "aesthetic" and "cognitive."
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intellectual satisfaction.75 In artistic experience, sentience is liberated
from the drag of biological relevance, while intelligence is liberated
from the constraints of discursive reasoning.76
This is why aestheticians of every school have insisted on the require-
ment of detachment, "contemplation," "aesthetic" attitude or attention,
Of course, artistic works affect people otherwise than as art,
just as pictures activate almost every one's imagination, but
only clear and intuitive minds really understand the vital
import, while the average person reacts to the things de-
picted, and turns away if he can find nothing to promote his
discursive thoughts or stimulate his actual emotions.1
7
or objectivity. It is the basis for the aesthetic psychologist Edward
Bullough's famous theory of the need for "psychical distance" between
the work and its public (including the artist) .
7
8
Professor Bullough believed this distance is obtained by "sep-
arating the object and its appeal from one's self, by putting it out of
gear with practical needs and ends." 79 It does not imply a purely
intellectual or impersonal relation between man and work, but a
peculiar relation "filtered" of the "practical, concrete nature of its
appeal." 1o The ideal in both creation and appreciation is the "utmost
decrease of Distance without its disappearance." 8'
The ability to maintain this distance varies. Artists can distance
even the most personal affections sufficiently to make them aesthetically
appreciable, at least to themselves. For the average person, however,
"a limit does exist which marks the minimum at which his appreciation
75 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 397.
76 See B. LoNERGAN, INSIGHT 185 (1957).
77 S. LANGER, stpra note 60, at 166-67.
78 See id. at 318; E. BuI.ouGa, AEsrHETIcs 93-130 (1957). On the vital rele-
vance of "distance" to aesthetic experience, and its incompatibility with obscenity
or pornography, see Kaplan, supra note 73, at 548: "Only when we hold the work
of art at arm's length is it artistic at all. The work brings emotions to mind or
presents them for contemplation. When they are actually felt, we have overstepped
the bounds of art." See also Gardiner, Moral Principles Towards a Definition of
the Obscene, 20 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROB. 560, 563 (1955). The concept of distance
makes a Supreme Court appearance in Mr. Justice Brennan's footnote quotation
from a dissenting opinion in the lower court, in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 415 n.2 (1966).
79 E. BULLOUGH, supra note 78, at 96.
80 Id. at 97. See also S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 49:
Schiller was the first thinker who saw what really makes "Schein," or sem-
blance, important for art: the fact that it liberates perception-and with it,
the power of conception-from all practical purposes, and lets the mind dwell
on the sheer appearance of things.81 E. BULLOUGH, supra note 78, at 100.
82 This, and what follows, is the most solid basis for the concept of "variable
obscenity." Arguments for the concept more usually have been based on a balancing-
of-interests analysis which, as we have argued, is not the bedrock of the present law.
See Gerber, A Suggested Solution to the Riddle of Obscenity, 112 U. P,. L. REv.
834, 847-56 (1964) ; Lockhart & McClure Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing
Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. Rv. 5, 68-88 (1960).
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can maintain itself in the aesthetic field," ' and as this limit varies
from person to person, so it varies from time to time, from subject-
matter to subject-matter and from culture to culture.s  In general,
"explicit references to organic affections, to the material existence of
the body, especially to sexual matters, lie normally below the Distance-
limit, and can be touched upon by Art only with special precautions." s5
Professor Bullough and his adherents were not concerned with dis-
cussing obscenity and pornography, and still less with condemning
them. But within their conceptual scheme it is easy to characterize
the pornographer as one calculating to avoid all the "special pre-
cautions" with which art must handle certain topics, if the psychical
distance necessary for aesthetic appreciation is to be maintained. Some
ages and cultures require fewer precautions than others; but whichever
are required at any given time and place, the pornographer is the man
who sets out to defy them. 6
The techniques by which the pornographer deliberately destroys
the aesthetic attitude include the attribution of male psychology to the
female, the arousing of identification with, and the compelling of
envy for, the fictional characters in their sexual opportunities and
exploits, 7 and many other narrative and descriptive devices which
may profitably be analyzed."" The designed effect of these techniques
is always the same-the replacement of aesthetic attention to the
material with an attitude in which the practical concerns of the reader
or viewer (in this case, a concern to achieve the emotionally aroused
states which he desires for himself) intrude upon and suppress an
understanding contemplation of the created symbol.8 9
83 E. BuLLouGH, supra note 78, at 101; cf. Commonwealth v. Buckley, 200 Mass.
346, 86 N.E. 910 (1909).
84 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 319. Distance also varies from context to context.
Hence, the concept of variable obscenity, which seems to have been adopted in Ginz-
burg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
85 E. BULLOUTGH, supra note 78, at 101.
86 See Kaplan, supra note 73, at 548: "Now pornography is promotional: it is
the obscene responded to with minimal psychic distance . . . . [A]s to esthetic
intent, this is lacking altogether in so far as the object is being read as pornographic."
As the psychologist van den Haag remarks, aesthetic merit is likely to reduce, if not
to eliminate, rather than augment the obscene effect. "The pinup has it all over art,
if it comes to sheer erotic stimulation." Haag, Quja Ineptum, in "To DnRAVE AND
CoRRupT'r . . ." 111, 118 (J. Chandos ed. 1962). Thus, also, Santayana's famous
theorem, that beauty tends to cancel lust. G. SANTAYANrA, REAsoN iN ART 171 (1934).
87 Cf. Sylvester, Tassels, and Other Gadgets, ENCOUNTER, June 1966, at 36, 38.
88 See the attempts set out in Lockhart & McClure, supra note 82, at 58-68.
89 See Henry Miller's remark:
When obscenity crops out in art, in literature more particularly, it usually
functions as a technical device; the element of the deliberate which is there
has nothing to do with sexual excitation, as in pornography.... Its purpose
is to awaken, to usher in a sense of reality.
Miller, supra note 71, at 587. Obviously, what Miller (and Kaplan, supra note 73)
calls "obscenity" would in principle, on our analysis, be constitutionally protected
art, and not obscene.
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This is not to argue that obscenity should be proscribed because
it destroys aesthetic appreciation or threatens art, nor, indeed, that it
should be proscribed for any other reason. The concern of this
article is not with the rights and wrongs of obscenity, but with the
purely constitutional question of whether obscenity is within the first
amendment's protected area of "speech." Under the present con-
stitutional dispensation, expression is protected "speech" precisely to
the extent that it derives from and appeals to the intellectual end of
the intellect-emotion continuum. The relevant implication of our
discussion of psychical distance and its destruction by obscene ex-
pression is this: expression that threatens psychical distance does so
by shifting its appeal towards the emotion end of the intellect-emotion
continuum, and by suppressing the intellectual component in the
aesthetic attitude.
The aesthetic attitude is constituted by a unique balance of in-
tellect and feeling in the contemplation and grasp of a symbol that
expresses the idea of emotion or feeling. In Langer's words, psychical
distance is simply "our natural relation to a symbol that embodies an
idea and presents it for our contemplation . . . 'cleared of the prac-
tical nature of its appeal.' "90 It is intelligence that contemplates and
grasps ideas, in whatever form they are embodied; the ideas in art
are embodied in a sensuous symbol. Hence, whatever attacks con-
templation and aesthetic understanding must, by the same token,
obscure the expressive and intelligible form of the work as symbol,
leaving only its potentiality for being used to stimulate feelings.
Burstyn " and Kingsley Pictures92 imply that art by definition
must fall within the area of what is constitutionally protected "speech."
It would be a mistake, however, to adopt a simplistic notion 93 of the
sort of idea that art expresses. That idea is not a "message" or doc-
trine that ratiocination can conceive or discourse communicate. It is
the symbol of feeling, whose sensuous quality is in the service of its
vital import and whose unique power "lies in the fact that it is an
abstraction, a symbol, the bearer of an idea." " Art "gives us forms
of imagination and forms of feeling." '5 Usually, "when one speaks
of 'reason' at all, one tacitly assumes its discursive pattern." " Such
an assumption might be thought to lie behind the Kingsley Pictures
explanation of art's status within the protected realm of ideas, intellect
90 S. LANGER, supra note 60, at 319.
91Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
92 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
9
3See, e.g., Note, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1063, 1084-85 (1964).
o4 S. LANGER, =pra note 60, at 47.
95 Id. at 397 (emphasis in original).
90Id. at 29.
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and reason. "But in a broader sense any appreciation of form . . .
is 'reason'; and discourse with all its refinements . . . is only one
possible pattern." "
In sum, artistic creation and appreciation, though they do not
belong to the realm of ideas rather than to the realm of emotions, are,
in a special way, at least as irreduciably bound up with intelligence as
with feeling.' It remains only to point out that, though practical diffi-
culties of characterization are undeniable, obscene expressions as con-
stitutionally defined cannot claim the protection due to art; to the
extent that an appeal is made to prurient interest, the psychical distance
essential to an aesthetic attitude is liable to be destroyed. Such de-
struction is achieved, moreover, in a precisely relevant fashion; it dis-
rupts the contemplative and intellectual component of the aesthetic
attitude and, through direct emotional stimulation, obscures the idea
which the work, as art, symbolically expresses and communicates to
those willing to give it the aesthetic attention required to understand it.
IV
It remains only to show in more detail how the dialectic of
"reason" and "passion" has shaped the constitutional law of obscene
expression. We have already argued that the two-level or reason-
passion theory provides a working rationale for the application or
refusal of constitutional protection to expressions alleged to be obscene.
In fact, it is clear that whenever the type of speech, as distinct from
the time, place and manner of expression, is in issue the majority on
the Court will respond to the seminal passage in Chaplinsky:
Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly out-
weighed by the social interest in order and morality.99
The constitutional premise of this passage is clarified by New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan:
971d. (emphasis added).
98 See R, BEGER, supra note 64, at 80: "... aesthetic awareness is at one and
the same time an experience and a judgment. .. " As critic Clive Bell has said:
Before we feel an aesthetic emotion for a combination of forms, do we not
perceive intellectually the rightness and necessity of the combination? If we
do, it would explain the fact that passing rapidly through a room we recog-
nize a picture to be good, although we cannot say that it has provoked much
emotion.
C. BEL , ART 26 (1914).
9315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). This passage has been quoted many times. See,
e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (libel case); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485; Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1952). See
also the reference to "the dissemination of information" in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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The constitutional safeguard, we have said, "was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social changes desired by the people." 100
The constitutional protection does not turn upon "the truth,
popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which are
offered." 101
Even Justices Black and Douglas pay an oblique tribute to this
implicit constitutional reliance on the contrast between reason and
passion, by their repeated allegations that the Court has refused to
protect "discussion or opinions" '02 in the obscenity cases. Thus sado-
masochistic fiction sold at a profit of several thousand percent is
euphemistically referred to by Mr. Justice Black as "views about sex"
and "subjects discussed." 103
Only the dictum in Winters v. New York 104 that "we do not
accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for a
free press applies only to the exposition of ideas," 105 seems to stand
in the way of this kind of analysis. But the meaning of this passage
is clarified by what immediately follows:
The line between the informing and the entertaining is too
elusive for the protection of that basic right. Everyone is
familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction. What
is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.10 6
Hence, the foregoing dictum in Winters is capable of being explicitly
absorbed into the two-level reasoning of Burstyn that "motion pictures
are a significant medium for the communication of ideas." 107 Despite
its protestations, the Court in Winters was protecting entertainment,
at least in part because of its significance in the exposition of ideas
100 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth).
101 Id. at 271 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963)). This
passage shows how wide of the mark Kalven was, .rpra note 36, at 217-18, in
announcing that the Times case disposed of the two-level theory. As did other
commentators, Kalven leapt from the premise that "'mere labels' of state law" can-
not control constitutional judgment, to the conclusion that no category of speech is
any longer beneath the protection of the first amendment. The mistake lies in for-
getting that the obscenity which is beneath first amendment protection, on the two-
level theory, is not a "mere label of state law" claiming "talismanic protection" but
a category which has ex hypothesi been "measured by standards that satisfy the first
amendment" before being declared outside the protection of that amendment. See also
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66, 270 (1964).
102 See, e.g., Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 517 (1966) (Black, J., dis-
senting).
103 Id. at 516-17.
104 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
105 Id. at 510.
106 Id.
107 343 U.S. at 501 (emphasis added).
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as "propaganda" and "doctrine." An answer to the dilemma with
which the Court was struggling in Winters, Burstyn and Kingsley
Pictures " lies in the recognition that, quite apart from propagation
of doctrine, some "entertainments" have artistic value, meaning and
symbolic significance and appeal to contemplation and understanding,
while others appeal to the sensual emotions in order to achieve a cal-
culated effect of obfuscating understanding with titillation, stimulation
and gratification.
A further question now arises, however, for if there is a simple
bedrock rationale for the exclusion of obscenity from constitutional
protection, that rationale can be expected to manifest itself in some,
if not all, 09 of the tests used in defining "obscenity." Such indeed
is the case. We argued in the first section that the adoption of the
"prurient interest" test and the abandonment of the "deprave and
corrupt" test, are ascribable to the two-level theory that obscenity
pertains to passion rather than reason. Appeals to passion are not the
concern of the first amendment; hence the priority of the prurient
interest test ever since the constitutional issue was squarely faced.
The cases since Roth confirm that the phrase "prurient interest" was
not intended by the Court to have the limited meaning attached to it
by the Model Penal Code:
an exacerbated, morbid, or perverted interest growing out
of the conflict between the universal sexual drive of the
individual and equally universal social controls of sexual
activity. 10
It has been argued that, under such a formulation, "totally erotic"
material might escape sanctions because it does not produce a sense of
guilt and shame in the average man."" But a Court which considers
as synonyms for "prurient interest," phrases such as "lustful thoughts,"
"lascivious longings," 2  "erotic interest," "' "titillation" 114 and
"erotically arousing" material providing "sexual stimulation" 1"5 to
the "salaciously disposed," 11' would hardly accede to such an argu-
108 Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959).
See text accompanying notes 54-60 supra.
109 Even a bedrock rationale need not be pushed to the full limits of its logic;
it may be qualified by competing rationales or considerations. Cf. H. L. A. Hart,
Prolegoinenon to the Pritwiples of Punishmnent, in PHilLoSopHY, PoLrrICS AND SoClETy
158, 160 (2d ser. Laslett & Runciman eds. 1962).
110 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10, Comment 6(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
11 Note, 51 CORNEL L.Q. 785, 789 (1966).
112 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n20 (1957).
113 Id. at 496 (Warren, CJ., concurring).
114 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966).
115 Id. at 471.
116Id. (quoting United States v. Redbuhn, 109 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1940) (L.
Hand, J.)).
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ment. "Passions," in the two-level theory, are not tricked out with
psychological theories of "psycho-social tension." 117 The funda-
mental question is simple: does the reader look for "titillation" or for
"intellectual content"? 118
The second of the three definitive elements of obscenity, as
crystallized in Memoirs v. Massachusetts, requires that "the material
is utterly without redeeming social value." 119 The link between this
test and the underlying reason-passion rationale, though not self-
evident, is revealed by the Court's incorporation in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts 120 of Mr. Justice Brennan's comment in Jacobellis v.
Ohio that "material dealing with sex in a manner that advocates
ideas . . . or that has literary or scientific or artistic value or any
other form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity
... Y) 121 This list of species of socially valuable material indicates
the intended character of the whole genus; it suggests that relevant
social importance derives from connection, direct or indirect, with the
intellectual realm. At the same time, assuming some consensus in the
relevant levels of American culture, this second defining element pro-
vides the courts with a broad common-sense criterion ("social im-
portance") in place of the intricate and controversial philosophical
categories which underpin that criterion, and which we have illustrated
in the preceding sections.
The third defining element of obscenity named in Memoirs v.
Massachusetts is that of patent offensiveness and affront to con-
temporary community standards relating to the description or repre-
sentation of sexual matters. Offensiveness correlates with that which
destroys psychical distance for a given culture, person and context.
There are people, of course, who often like to eliminate distance, but
others feel threatened and shocked when confronted with objects that
might overcome their ability to distance and their rational control.
Moreover, ability to maintain distance varies widely. The test of
patent offensiveness as judged by current community standards seeks
to ensure that the law is geared to an average standard of robustness
in these matters. The test tends to protect at least the "classics," since
current community standards can be taken to recognize implicitly that
the classics are part of, rather than offenders against, those standards
117 See MoDEL PENAL CODE §207.10, Comment 6(c) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
118 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 470 (1966). The fact that the
notion of "arousing lustful thoughts" is central to the constitutional rationale for
excluding obscenity from the first amendment does not imply that the same notion
need be central to the legislative rationale for proscribing obscenity. See section V
of text infra.
119383 U.S. at 418.
120 Id. at 419 n.7.
12137$ U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
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and that the classics discipline, rather than disturb, people's ability to
maintain psychical distance. The use of the test in Ginzburg is evidence
of its connection with the reason-passion rationale, for Mr. Justice
Brennan says that to represent one's publications as erotically arousing
not only stimulates the reader to look for titillation rather than in-
tellectual content, but also "would tend to force public confrontation
with the potentially offensive aspects of the work" and "heightens the
offensiveness of the publications to those who are offended by such
material." "s
Finally, the reason-passion theory of the first amendment fits
closely the Court's increasing concern with commerciality. As
Ginzburg indicates, the Court will judge the obscenity of publications
. . against a background of commercial exploitation of
erotica solely for the sake of their prurient appeal.'
"[I]f the object [of a work] is material gain for the
creator through an appeal to the sexual curiosity and ap-
petite," the work is pornographic.1 4
The relevance of commerciality is not that the seller profits from his
activity; 2' rather, the fact that he is a mere seller might indicate that
he is not trying to engage in activity protected by the first amendment,
i.e., the communication of ideas in whatever form.
The panderer is participating in the marketplace of prurient in-
terest, not in the marketplace of ideas. His participation, therefore,
will be taken at face value, even if the material is not devoid of value.20
This emphasis on commercial exploitation is wholly consistent with
the two-level theory. The two levels of the marketplace correlate with
the two functional levels of the mind; to "peddle" material to the public
on the strength of its appeal to the passions tends to negative any in-
trinsic social value the material may have and to remove it from
the level of constitutionally protected speech.
The foregoing discussion of the current tests for defining ob-
scenity attempts merely to indicate the conceptual link between these
tests and the fundamental two-level rationale; it is not intended as a
full exposition of the tests, still less as an exploration of the many
practical legal problems that they raise. Nor does it attempt to show
=2383 U.S. at 470.
= Id. at 466.
4 Id. at 471.
M Id. at 474-75 (1966) ; Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952).
16 383 U.S. at 470. It is the participation in the marketplace, not the work as
such, that is suppressed in this case.
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that these tests are preferable to others which might be derived from
the same rationale. For example, the test championed by Justices
Clark and White in Memoirs v. Massachusetts 17 is just as derivable
from the reason-passion rationale as is the test of redeeming social
value; the selection of one in preference to the other will depend on
other factors. A rationale may be recognized as fundamental, without
being adopted as exhaustive and exclusive of all other constitutional
or legal considerations.
V
We have been discussing why obscene expression is outside the
first amendment. Nothing we have said has been directed to the
questions of whether and why obscenity should be regulated. A dis-
cussion of these questions would take us far afield, not only into
empirical enquiries but also into the fundamental question of whether
our criminal law is, and ought to be, designed to eliminate "harms" or
whether it also seeks, and should seek, to express, vindicate and uphold
wider values. Moreover, there is no reason why any rationale for ex-
cluding obscenity from constitutional protection must coincide with a
rationale for proscribing obscenity by criminal or administrative
measures.
Still, the approach we have described has three advantages over
alternative approaches. First, the prurient interest test does have an
explicit and intelligible connection with the rationale for excluding
obscenity from constitutional protection. That rationale is the two-
level theory. On the other hand, the "hard-core pornography" test '-
has no intelligible connection with any constitutional rationale for
denial of first amendment protection, except perhaps in Mr. Justice
Stewart's suggestion that hard-core pornography "cannot conceivably
be characterized as embodying communication of ideas" -- in which
case the rationale is the same as that adopted by Mr. Justice Brennan.
The question then must be why the modified prurient interest test
should not be adopted in place of the uninformative notion of "hard-
core pornography." 180
127 383 U.S. at 441-42 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 461-62 (White, J., dis-
senting).
128 The test is -employed differently by Mr. Justice Harlan in relation to federal
censorship, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting), and by Mr. Justice Stewart generally. E.g., id. at 499 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ; Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
1
29 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 499 n.3 (1966).
13D It is interesting that in Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of. Roth, in
1966 THE SUPnME CouRT RmIEw 7 (Kurland ed.), the attempt to explain "hard-core
pornography" falls back on "patent offensiveness" plus a "self-defining" element found
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Second, the reason-passion theory of speech has the merit of
emphasizing the serious unreality of Justices Black and Douglas's
notion that men like Roth, Alberts and Mishkin are somehow engaged
in the same activity-"expression of views and opinion"-as are the
bona fide participants in the marketplace of ideas, who advance the
contest of reason visualized in the Federalist.
Third, the theory that obscenity is not protected speech has the
advantage of not involving the Court in a "balancing-of-interests"
test. For in such a speculative and controversial area, any attempt to
balance interests or even to articulate the rationale for proscribing
obscenity, would be beyond judicial competence. It is better left to
the experiments of legislatures and the changing worldly-wisdom of
juries, working within the relatively narrow area now left them by
the Court.
in "writings designed to act as psychological aphrodisiacs or stimulants," id. at 72,
where
[t]he reader is meant to identify either with the narrator . . . or with the
general situation to a sufficient extent to produce at least the physical con-
comitants of sexual excitement . . . that he would have were he taking part
in the activities described.
Id. (quoting Gorer, in DoEs PORNOGRAPHY MATrz? 32 (C. Rolph ed. 1961)). This
amounts to little more (or less) than a deliberate "appeal to prurient interest," accom-
plished by the destruction of aesthetic distance. Magrath's suggestion that discovery
of this second "element" involves "attention solely to the material per se," id. at 74,
cannot be admitted; to discover whether material is "too sexually arousing," id. at
75, one has to look beyond "the material alone' to its "prurient interest to some
hypothetical average person." In any event, Magrath's test, if adopted, would rest
on the same bedrock rationale as the current test.
